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Eyes wide shut: persistent conflict and liberal peace building in Nepal and Sri 
Lanka 
Madurika Rasaratnam (LSE)1 and Mara Malagodi (SOAS)2 
The decisive, albeit different, endings of armed conflict in Sri Lanka and 
Nepal and subsequent post-war developments challenge key assumptions 
about conflict that have informed post-Cold War international efforts to 
produce peace in such conflict zones. International intervention – including 
in Sri Lanka and Nepal – characterises armed conflict as sustained by 
specific political economies that can only be stably resolved by establishing 
liberal democracy and market economics. This paper examines liberal peace 
engagement in Sri Lanka and Nepal to challenge a crucial assumption of the 
persistent conflict thesis, namely the separation between political 
contestation and armed conflict. It argues that the divergent post-conflict 
outcomes of continuing ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka and constitutional 
reform in Nepal reveal strong continuities in the dynamics of pre-war, war 
and post-war politics. This continuity challenges the presumed separation of 
politics and violence that drove international engagement to produce liberal 
peace and suggests that such engagement, far from encouraging reform, 
may have (inadvertently) sustained conflict in both cases. 
 
The decisive, albeit very different, endings of the Sri Lankan and Nepali armed conflicts and 
the subsequent, equally divergent, post conflict developments in the two states pose an 
important challenge to the understandings of conflict that have informed two decades of 
international efforts to produce sustainable peace in conflict zones across the world. Post-
Cold War efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts have been driven by a specific 
characterisation of conflict dynamics. In the policy prescriptions and aid policies of a range 
of powerful states, multilateral and non-state actors, organised violence is understood to be 
sustained by its own political economy, whereby armed non-state actors in particular are held 
to have an interest in perpetuating conflict and thwarting the possibility of peace. According 
to this conceptualisation, while violent conflict is said to be driven by the possibility of 
predatory economic activity, its lasting resolution is held to require institutional strengthening 
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and restructuring to produce a state capable of effective (i.e. liberal, market and democratic) 
governance. Furthermore, there is also a clear policy consensus that in the absence of such 
reform, conflict will be persistent or recurrent. This framing of conflict, in which organised 
violence and political contestation are treated as inherently distinct, if intermittently linked, 
phenomenon, has informed post-Cold War peace building efforts across the world, including 
in Nepal and Sri Lanka.  
The political dynamics of the Nepali and Sri Lankan armed conflicts and their clear linkages 
to pre-conflict and post-conflict dynamics pose important challenges to this understanding of 
violent conflict. This is not primarily, or even most importantly, because in both cases armed 
conflict appears, for the time being at least, to have ended. Instead, it is the pre-war and post- 
war dynamics of Sri Lanka and Nepal that pose a more important analytical challenge to the 
persistent conflict thesis. That is, while the conflicts ended very differently – in Sri Lanka 
through a decisive government military victory and in Nepal through a peace agreement 
followed by a constitutional process – both endings and subsequent events have strong 
continuities with political objectives sought by conflict protagonists before, during and after 
armed conflict. In this sense in Nepal and Sri Lanka conflict persists after war’s end, not 
through violence alone, but through politics. That is, the many motivations, interests and 
specific political economies that were apparent in sustaining the Nepali and Sri Lankan civil 
wars did not exhaust the ontology of conflict per se, and the political objectives pursued 
through the war – as well as the pre-war and subsequently post-war periods – remain crucial.  
In Sri Lanka the ending of the three decades old civil war (1983-2009) between government 
forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has paved the way, despite 
international pressure, for an accelerated and illiberal project of state-led Sinhala Buddhist 
majoritarianism – and concomitant Tamil resistance framed in nationalist terms.3 Crucially, 
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these dynamics are not only wholly continuous with the island’s post-independence, pre-war, 
history, but were also evident in the rhetoric and strategies of protagonists during the war 
itself. Similarly, in Nepal the outcomes of the ongoing post-war constitutional process (‘the 
solution’ in liberal peace terms) are directly linked not only to the political agenda the Nepali 
Maoists set out well before their armed insurgency began in 1996, but also the basis of 
rhetoric and strategies during the period of insurgency (1996-2006). This article argues that 
these starkly divergent outcomes to armed conflict were shaped in determinate, albeit 
unintentional ways, by international interventions that adopted a framing of the organised 
violence of the Sri Lankan and Nepali armed conflicts as quite apart from the dynamics of 
normal political contestation.  
International engagement in the Nepali and Sri Lankan conflicts was part of the expanding 
pattern of international intervention in numerous conflict sites in the past two decades. The 
notion of internal conflict as persistent and recurrent has been linked to – the now taken for 
granted as inter-related – issues of security and development. Persistent conflict is, thus, seen 
to generate multiple threats – such as refugee flows, terrorism and arms proliferation – to 
local, regional and global security, whilst also hindering the development processes that alone 
could inoculate conflict ridden states against repeated bouts of violence, and thus ensure 
future stability and security. The protracted and multifaceted processes of international 
engagement in the Sri Lankan and Nepali conflicts were driven by this dominant post-Cold 
War consensus that intra-state conflict represented serious threats to international security 
and global order, as well as by the further conviction that liberal democracy and market 
economics provide the surest foundation for self-sustaining peace: a stable peace is 
necessarily a liberal peace. Consequently, a range of international actors and agencies, 
working through a variety of projects, processes and mechanisms, sought to establish stable, 
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inclusive and democratic institutions as well as market liberalisation in Sri Lanka and Nepal.4 
As in other conflict sites, international actors pursued liberal peace through a range of co-
ordinated, albeit not centrally planned, activities undertaken by a range of state, multilateral 
and non state actors making up what have been labelled ‘strategic complexes’.5 The 
international community has variously sought, for example, to empower civil society actors 
to build peace at the grassroots, foster constitutional dialogue, support spaces for economic 
regeneration (including through development) and, importantly, strengthen state security 
forces to confront and contain its armed non-state challengers. Inevitably these activities have 
both reinforced and at times undermined each other and the results of liberal peace 
interventions have been mixed, by their own terms and ambitions.6 Nevertheless, it is argued 
here that international interventions, conceived and executed through the liberal peace 
framing of conflict, were crucial in determining the starkly divergent outcomes for liberal 
peace in both Nepal (an as yet incomplete ‘success’) and Sri Lanka (a self-evident ‘failure’). 
Liberal peace interventions were premised on the belief that armed conflict, driven by 
specific political economies, not only represents a threat to state integrity, and therefore 
global security, but can also only be ameliorated by a restoration of legitimate state authority. 
In research that quickly became hugely influential from the 1990’s, Paul Collier and others 
argued that armed conflict was driven primarily by the feasibility or opportunity for loot, 
plunder and criminal forms of economic accumulation.7 Furthermore, the ensuing illegal ‘war 
economy’ was then seen to provide the motivation and finance for the perpetuation of 
conflict. In other words, it is ‘greed’ or ‘feasibility’ and ‘opportunity’, not political 
‘grievance’ that ultimately matters for conflict persistence.8 Grievances may create the 
conditions for violence, but ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ could also engineer grievances to 
mobilise for war. Such neo-classical reading of intra-state conflict as the perverse outcome of 
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more or less rational utility maximising informed another influential argument put forward by 
Mary Kaldor that intra-state wars in the post-Cold War era (‘new’ wars) are qualitatively 
distinct from the organised industrial warfare characteristic of the nation-state era (‘old’ 
wars).9 Kaldor connects many of the characteristic features she identifies with new wars, 
particularly their links to predatory forms of economic accumulation, to the accelerating 
processes of globalisation that have served to erode the state’s monopoly of legitimate 
violence. Crucially, such diagnosis of conflict through neo-classical/ rational choice 
approaches and the broader characterisation of ‘new wars’ prescribe strategies for liberal 
peace interventions that turn on marginalising conflict protagonists and their stated political 
objectives as either irrelevant or even harmful to the creation of self sustaining liberal peace. 
Armed conflict and its non state protagonists are to be treated, therefore, primarily as threats 
to the possibility of peace that must first be contained for peace to be made possible.  
In short, while liberal peace conceptions draw a sharp distinction between the order of 
politics and the disorder of armed conflict, the Sri Lankan and Nepali case-studies reveal how 
political and armed conflict are intimately related.10 Indeed, the close continuities between 
the pre-war, war and post-war eras in both countries, traced below, suggest that these armed 
conflicts were – in Clausewitzian terms – the continuation of politics by other means,11 and 
the politics of the post-war period is, as Foucault has argued, the continuance of war by other 
means.12  
Liberal peace, persistent conflict, armed non state actors and the war on 
terror 
The understanding of conflict as an outcome of institutional weakness or illegitimacy 
coexisting with perverse economic dynamics has informed attempts to establish liberal peace 
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around the world. To this end liberal peacebuilding in conflict zones works to establish and 
secure liberal democratic market states capable of stably fostering development and thereby 
contributing to international security and global order. The ultimate focus of liberal 
peacebuilding might be global security, yet its key target remains the territorial state. As 
Oliver Richmond notes, ‘the fundamental object of liberal peace-building is the creation of 
cosmopolitan states within an international order.’13 It is in this way that internal conflict, and 
the associated risks of state failure or weakness, come to pose existential threats to global 
security; as Francis Fukuyama warns, ‘weak and failing states have arguably become the 
single most important problem for international order.’14 Like the democratic peace thesis, its 
international variant, the liberal peace consensus draws a clear link between global peace and 
domestic order. The production of global order requires the elimination of local disorder i.e. 
the liberal pacification of conflict. As Richmond puts it, the ‘liberal peace discourse has 
effectively become a Leviathan which all must assume and accept as a counter to the 
Hobbesian state of nature.’15 In other words, liberal peacebuilding regards armed conflict, not 
as the (violent) pursuit of competing political conceptions of the state, but primarily as a 
threat to the creation of a strong and legitimate state that alone makes ‘normal’ politics 
possible. Crucially, armed conflict is also the primary threat to the reconstitution of such a 
state – and thereby poses a threat to international order.  
The liberal peace imperative to transform conflict zones into functioning liberal, market 
democracies is clearly linked to the understandings of conflict as driven by the violent pursuit 
of perverse economic incentives, associated with institutional weakness and leading to 
recurrent cycles of violence along with continued institutional failure. For example, Paul 
Collier and Anke Heoffler’s neoclassical approach characterises armed non-state actors as 
‘violent quasi criminal organisations’16 that will tend to emerge where the opportunity for 
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economic predation is available, primarily in areas of commodity production, with large 
numbers of under or unemployed young men and where the state is relatively weak. In a later 
development of this argument, they suggest that rebellion against the state should be thought 
of more in terms of feasibility than motivation: regardless of the motivations of the initial 
‘entrepreneurs’, rebellions will happen where conditions are propitious.17 This analysis of 
civil wars has been criticised in a number of ways: the understanding of individual rationality 
on which its based,18 the validity of the empirical instruments used as ‘proxies’ to measure 
greed, grievance and feasibility, and the ability of this model to explain the ‘essence of war as 
a distinct social activity’ in which ‘thousands of people become involved in highly trying and 
hazardous forms of collective action’ and often without ‘receiving economic selective 
incentives to do so’.19 Despite these criticisms, this analysis has become commonsense. What 
is significant about this approach is that not only is armed violence categorically separated 
from political intent, but also the ultimate guarantee against armed violence is the re-
establishment of a viable and (coercively) strong state capable of deterring future attempts at 
violent insurrection. As Collier et al put it:  
‘An implication of the feasibility hypothesis is that if the incidence of civil war is to be 
reduced, which seems appropriate given its appalling consequences, it will need to be more 
difficult. This is orthogonal to the rectification of justified grievances, the case for which is 
implied directly by the concept of ‘justified grievances’ without any need to invoke the 
perilous consequences of the failure to do so’.20  
In a similar vein, Mary Kaldor’s characterisation of post-cold war conflicts as ‘new’ wars, 
although not formally reliant on neo-classical economics, makes a comparable set of claims. 
She argues that such conflicts emerge as a consequence of the forces of globalisation that 
have weakened state authority and the state’s monopoly of violence from both above and 
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below.21 The ‘new wars’ that emerge in this context draw their funding from illegal economic 
activities and use ‘backward looking’ ethnic identity politics as a means of mobilising 
support from amongst a politically alienated and economically disadvantaged population.22 
She contrasts such ‘new wars’ with the ‘old wars’ of classical modernity that were organised 
hierarchically around the nation-state framework, financed through taxation and organised 
around forward looking political projects. While the empirical basis for a sharp distinction 
between new and old wars has been criticised,23 what remains important is the separation 
between legitimate politics, on the one hand, and organised violence, on the other, along with 
the imperative to restore legitimate order. Armed conflict is seen primarily as associated with 
a breakdown of order, motivated by predation and mobilised on the basis of ‘fragmentative, 
backward-looking and exclusive’ identity politics.24 The amelioration of armed conflicts 
cannot be on the basis of negotiations between warring parties25 and their often particularistic 
agendas, but requires instead the mobilisation of a new form of cosmopolitan politics, based 
on cosmopolitan values.26 This involves the reconstitution of organised violence by ‘public 
authorities’ including ‘national’ authorities, albeit within an overarching global framework of 
cosmopolitan governance.27 
The analysis presented here shows that in attempting to radically transform sites of apparent 
persistent violence, as in Nepal and Sri Lanka, liberal peace actors also inevitably seek to 
shape the conflict itself, although the outcomes of this, as in Sri Lanka, are often perverse. 
Furthermore, these more or less intentional outcomes of liberal peace actors’ interventions 
are based on (mis) characterisations of conflict protagonists’ intentions and characteristics as 
either in keeping with, or, alternatively antithetical to the broad normative and institutional 
objectives of liberal peacebuilding. As Mark Duffield notes, liberal peace building ‘is geared 
to a logic of exclusion and selective incorporation’28 whereby those perceived as committed 
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to the liberal peace project are included and rewarded whilst those deemed inimical are 
excluded and subject to sanction.  
‘Degrees of agreement, or apparent agreement, within such normative frameworks establish 
lines of inclusion and exclusion. Liberal peace is a system of carrots and sticks where co-
operation paves the way for development assistance and access to wider networks of global 
governance, while non-cooperation risks varying degrees of conditionality and isolation.’29 
This analysis of conflict protagonists is exemplified in the World Bank’s analyses of 
persistent conflict in the ‘World Development Report 2011’.30 In identifying ways of 
breaking persistent cycles of violence, the report calls for a strengthening of state defence and 
policing capacities in order to deter ‘armed threats from rebel or criminal groups’ and ‘those 
contemplating political or criminal violence’.31 At the same time, other local actors identified 
as ‘national reformers’32 and ‘national leaders’33 are charged to work alongside their 
‘international partners’ in establishing ‘legitimate institutions that can provide a sustained 
level of citizen security, justice and jobs’.34 The persistent conflict framework, thus, sets out 
an imperative to produce strengthened liberal democratic states by working in conjunction 
with local protagonists – ‘national reformers’ – deemed capable and willing to engage in 
liberal peace building, whilst marginalising those whose interests and identities are deemed 
wedded to the reproduction of violence – these are to be contained, or ‘overcome’, with 
‘strong policing and military capacities.’ As this article will show, it is precisely this 
framework that underpinned multifaceted international efforts to produce liberal peace in 
both Nepal and Sri Lanka. In both cases international actors initially backed state elites, seen 
as potential ‘national reformers’, against their respective armed non-state opponents. Sri 
Lankan and Nepali state elites, deemed both willing for and capable of liberal reform, were 
thus rewarded with aid and other forms of support. Meanwhile their respective opponents, the 
10 
 
LTTE and the Maoists, were characterised as ‘specialists in violence’ or ‘spoilers’ and 
excluded while being subject to various forms of sanction, such as proscription and 
internationally backed state violence. However, as the analysis of Sri Lanka and Nepal 
shows, this framing of conflict misunderstood the strong connections between deep –seated 
local politics and the organised violence of conflict and therefore, whilst failing to facilitate 
the very processes of inclusive reform international actors sought, fuelled war (albeit 
unintentionally) in Sri Lanka and Nepal.  
Finally, a note on the links between liberal peace building, persistent conflict and the ‘War on 
Terror’ (WoT). Even before the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, 
the understanding of armed conflict inherent to the liberal peace framework had already led 
to a convergence, as identified by Mark Duffield35 and many others, in international policy 
and praxis between the pursuit of ‘security’ and ‘development’ in the developing world. 
Whilst Al-Qaeda and its affiliates understandably became emblematic of the ensuing WoT, 
the notion of terrorism had already expanded in international policy to include almost all 
major armed non-state actors around the world – as exemplified by the list of armed 
organisations proscribed as terrorists by the US in 1997 and the UK in February 2001. 
However, the ambition to end terrorism and pursue liberal peace in disparate conflict 
countries through measures to produce both security and development was impelled by a new 
urgency after 9/11. With war-torn or otherwise ‘fragile’ or ‘collapsing’ states deemed 
potential incubators and havens for terrorism, ending armed conflict, producing security (i.e. 
ending and foreclosing violence) and ensuing development became a priority not only for 
stability in the South, but security at home in the West.36 While the adoption of the liberal 
peace discourse in the expansion of the WoT to target Iraq and other claimed ‘rogue’ state 
sponsors of terrorism has caused some advocates of liberal peace to recoil, the foundational 
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assumptions of the WoT and persistent conflict thesis – and that such conflicts held the 
potential of state collapse and possibly conditions for (local and global) terrorism – have 
largely remained uncontested. Indeed, over a decade after the WoT began, the convergence of 
‘security’ and ‘development’ has become highly institutionalised; the US military, for 
example, is now increasingly the lead actor directing America’s humanitarian and 
development (anti-terrorism) efforts in Africa, while the European Union’s new external 
affairs service is explicitly seeking to further integrate the bloc’s massive aid program into its 
joint security and foreign policy strategies, in which a foremost concern is to confront ‘all 
violence, all terror, and all fanaticism’ and thereby ‘change the course of world affairs’.37 In 
short, after 9/11, international efforts to eradicate terrorism and those to expand liberal peace 
(i.e. liberal peacebuilding) became integral to each other. 
Politics and conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal  
International liberal peace building engagement was evident in Sri Lanka from the early post-
Cold War period, and in Nepal from 2001. While this initially meant that international actors 
by and large backed the Nepali and Sri Lankan states against their respective non-state armed 
opponents, this cannot be interpreted in realist terms as activity aimed simply at securing the 
state. Instead, international actors simultaneously sought the transformation of the state into a 
liberal democratic, market state. In other words, state elites and actors received international 
backing only in so far as they were perceived to be committed to the broader objectives of 
liberal transformation; when these perceptions changed, international actors withdrew their 
support and were willing to work through alternative means to secure the liberal peace.38 This 
is exemplified in Nepal at the twilight of the conflict in 2005, when international community 
ceased supporting the monarchy’s counter-insurgency campaign and, instead, backed a peace 
process with a new alliance between the hitherto opposed Maoist insurgents and mainstream 
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parliamentary parties. Similarly in Sri Lanka, the international community has at different 
times turned to different state elites to deliver the liberal peace, supporting each in its efforts 
to confront the LTTE. Despite staunchly backing the present Sri Lankan regime until it 
vanquished the LTTE, since the war’s end in 2009 liberal states have become more hostile, as 
the government spurns their demands for liberal reform.39  
International engagement in both the Sri Lankan and Nepali conflicts is thus best understood 
as an effort to produce liberal peace in which conflict protagonists’ ‘agreement or, apparent 
agreement’ subjects them to logics of ‘exclusion and selective incorporation’.40 This 
framework inevitably separates political contestation from the dynamics of armed conflict. 
However, as the discussion below shows, the divergent outcomes underway in post-war 
Nepal and Sri Lanka can only be understood in terms of the deep links between competing 
political projects and the use of force in their pursuit i.e. armed conflict. The divergent 
outcomes of conflict in the two states were finally determined not by conflicting actors’ 
cosmopolitan or exclusivist values, or indeed their linkages to various types of economic 
activity. Instead, the ongoing dynamics of constitution-making in Nepal and intensifying 
Sinhala majoritarianism (and Tamil resistance) in Sri Lanka are continuations of political 
projects that have been pursued over many decades by both violent and non violent means.  
In pointing to these continuities, we are not suggesting that all acts of violence were purely 
motivated and controlled by political ideology. Long-run conflicts invariably bring together 
actors with a diversity of motivations and there are often important disjunctions between 
local and elite-level drivers of violence.41 However, the argument here shows that the 
organised violence of the Sri Lankan and Nepali armed conflicts was clearly linked to 
competing, long-standing, political projects and the outcomes cannot be explained except 
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through these linkages – which may indeed have been mediated at the micro level through 
complex and fluctuating motivations, interests and political economies.  
There are of course significant differences between the two cases. In Nepal, the protagonists 
broadly shared a national framework, whereas Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict has been driven by 
two divergent framings of national identity; one of Sinhala Buddhist dominance and the other 
of Tamils and Sinhalese as politically equal collectives. However, this does not suggest a 
simple opposition between left/right ideological conflict in Nepal and ‘ethnic’ conflict in Sri 
Lanka. Indeed, Stathis Kalyvas has challenged the often made distinction between ethnic and 
ideological conflicts by a comparison of the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq.42 A similar 
comparison of the Sri Lankan and Nepali civil wars is beyond the scope of this paper – but it 
is important to note that while the Nepali conflict included ethnic elements, Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic conflict is not a simple opposition of self and other. Instead, Tamil and Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalisms must be viewed as historically evolved and deep seated political 
projects that required amongst other things the political accommodation of intra-Sinhala and 
intra-Tamil ethnic differences.43 Notwithstanding the apparent greater importance of ethnicity 
in Sri Lanka’s conflict, it is these linkages between politics and violence demonstrated in the 
political continuities of the pre-war, war and post-war eras that make these apparently 
dissimilar cases comparable sites of international liberal peace intervention. The following 
sections will therefore discuss in turn the dynamics of conflict and international engagement 
in Sri Lanka and Nepal before the paper comes to a conclusion that briefly discusses the 
implications of the arguments presented here for ongoing international efforts to produce 




International support for the Sri Lankan state as an agent willing and capable of liberal 
reform and the consequent effort to contain and marginalise the LTTE as the sole obstacle to 
the production of liberal order was apparent from the mid-1990s and continued until just 
before the end of the war (the reasons for the change are discussed below). This pattern of 
international engagement included the period of the Norwegian mediated peace process 
(2001-2006) and remained consistent through successive changes of Sri Lankan leadership. 
However, this is not simply a matter of supporting the state against armed threats. As 
discussed below, the international community’s tactical shifts in supporting competing 
Sinhala state elites at different times, as well the present growing and evident tensions 
between the Colombo government and its former international backers can only be 
understood in terms of the former’s commitment to the latter’s liberal peace project.  
International interventions for liberal peace began in 1994 with overt and enthusiast support 
for newly elected President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s strategy of a ‘war for peace.’ Along 
with a massive military offensive against LTTE held areas, Kumaratunga unveiled a 
constitutional reform ‘package’ that promised limited decentralisation of Sri Lanka’s unitary 
and inherently Sinhala-Buddhist state and also pursued a program of economic liberalisation 
established by her predecessors. In this strategy, the LTTE was conceptualised as an 
intractable obstacle to (liberal) peace, distinct from the Tamil population and their grievances, 
and in fact the driver of the conflict itself. The defeat of the LTTE was thereby deemed 
necessary for the very possibility of inclusive peacebuilding. This approach to ending Sri 
Lanka’s conflict was supported by a ‘strategic complex’ including states (principally the US, 
UK, other EU states, Japan and others, as well as India), the World Bank and other donors, 
UN agencies, and an ‘epistemic community’ that generated the requisite ‘knowledge’ about 
the conflict, the LTTE, the island’s ethnic relations and so on – findings since severely 
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challenged by Sri Lanka’s post-war dynamics. This analysis also deeply informed the 
Norwegian-led international peace intervention from 2001.44 An exemplary statement of this 
view was made by the US Under-Secretary for Asia Nicholas Burns in 2006:  
“We have faith in the government and faith in the President of Sri Lanka. They do want to 
make peace. We also believe that the LTTE is a terrorist group responsible for massive 
bloodshed in the country and we hold the Tamil Tigers responsible for much of what has 
gone wrong in the country. We are not neutral in this respect. We support the government.”45 
International backing for Kumaratunga, whilst initially enthusiastic, was not, however, 
unconditional. By late 1999 as the military balance began to shift decisively towards the 
LTTE and she appeared unable or unwilling to push through liberalising constitutional 
reforms, the international community began actively exploring an alternative: namely 
negotiations between the LTTE and the main opposition United National Party (UNP). 
Norwegian diplomats began quietly facilitating talks between the LTTE and the UNP after 
2000, as donors, separately, began withdrawing support from the Kumaratunga-led 
government. The UNP and LTTE reached agreement on a Norwegian mediated peace 
process, and following the narrow defeat of Kumaratunga’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP)-led government by a UNP led coalition in the December 2001 general elections, the 
LTTE and new government signed a formal truce in February 2002 underwritten by 
international monitors. The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) included clauses on the 
‘normalisation’ of conditions in Tamil areas, the resettlement of the 800,000 displaced 
Tamils, the dismantling of ‘high security zones’ and disarming of government-backed 
paramilitaries. Although these key provisions remained substantively unimplemented by the 
government, international support was unwavering, and even though direct talks were short-
lived, in the first three years of the ceasefire, international donors rushed to provide billions 
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of dollars to the government to revive and rapidly liberalise the economy that was by 2001 in 
recession. (It is worth noting that three years after the end of the war in 2009 amongst key 
international demands being resisted by the Sri Lankan state are resettlement of displaced 
Tamils, de-militarization of the North-east and the disarming of government backed 
paramilitaries.) Donors also underwrote substantive efforts through international NGOs such 
as the Berghof Foundation, for grass roots ‘peacebuilding’, reconciliation and inter-ethnic 
‘dialogue’. 
The formal negotiation process was thus not envisaged by the international community as 
primarily about resolving an underlying conflict, even though Norwegian facilitators pushed 
for discussions on federalism. Instead, the peace process advanced liberal peace by 
precluding (the LTTE’s return to) war long enough at least to reconstitute the state’s military 
capacity and long enough to entrench economic liberalisation and undertake conflict-
ameliorating development and grass roots peacebuilding between ethnic communities. To this 
end the international community supported the rapid rearming and reconstitution of the 
exhausted Sri Lankan military,46 while aid flows to the state accelerated from 2002.  
The peace process eventual demise was associated with a number of factors. Firstly the LTTE 
withdrew from formal negotiations in mid-2003, citing Tamil frustration with the continuing 
humanitarian crisis – but retained its commitment to the ceasefire agreement and successively 
proposed two administrative mechanisms to address urgent humanitarian issues47 – both 
rejected by the Sri Lankan government. By early 2006, the UNP had lost successive elections 
that saw the triumph of a hardline Sinhala nationalist SLFP-led coalition that also brought to 
the Presidency Mahinda Rajapakse, the avowed Sinhala nationalist.48 Although the 
international community backed the UNP in its failed electoral campaigns, and unanimously 
expressed outrage over an LTTE-enforced boycott in Tamil areas that reportedly allowed 
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Rajapakse to triumph, international actors nevertheless swung decisively behind the new 
President’s proposed strategy of an aggressive military campaign against the LTTE coupled 
with an ‘All Party Representative Conference’ to formulate a political solution. The 
international ‘green light’49 – as it was termed – for a renewed military offensive against the 
LTTE came in early 2006, when Canada and the European Union proscribed the LTTE.  
The international community’s decisions during this period was thus premised on the belief 
that successive Sri Lankan governments, including Rajapakse’s, were willing and capable of 
engaging in liberal reform, whilst the LTTE remained the sole obstacle to the stable and 
peaceful resolution of armed conflict. This analysis ignored the long process of Sinhala 
Buddhist state formation – termed the ‘re-conquest of the majority’50 – that was evident as 
early as 1931, when Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon and a British colony) was granted 
substantial self-government with universal franchise. Indeed, by the 1970’s, long before the 
onset of conflict, Sri Lanka had ‘regressed to an illiberal, ethnocentric regime bent on Sinhala 
super-ordination and Tamil subjugation’.51 This was manifest in policies that successively 
excluded Tamils from the public sector employment, from the military and police, from 
higher education from and private sector activity alongside continuous state sponsored 
Sinhala colonisation of the Tamil speaking areas. 52 
Whilst the state led project of establishing Sinhala Buddhist political, economic and cultural 
dominance preceded the war and continues after it has ended, the demand for Tamil political 
independence likewise preceded the LTTE and has continued since its military demise. The 
insistence on Tamil – Sinhala (collective) political equality was central to Tamil politics from 
the early twentieth century and the demand for territorial autonomy was fitfully made from 
the early 1920s.53 From 1956, amidst an escalation of the Sinhala Buddhist state-building 
project, Tamil Politics was dominated by the Federal Party which demanded territorial 
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autonomy in the Tamil speaking areas and insisted on Tamil – Sinhala political equality.54 
The escalation from territorial or federal autonomy to outright political independence came in 
1977 with the massive electoral victory of a coalition of Tamil parties on the platform of the 
famous 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution that detailing a history of marginalisation, called for 
an independent Tamil state – over six years before the civil war actually began in 1983.55  
In other words, Sri Lanka’s civil war had long political antecedents. The LTTE emerged in 
the late 1970s to launch an armed struggle for independence, explicitly citing the historical 
impossibility of negotiating an outcome, and all out civil war erupted in the wake of the anti-
Tamil pogrom of July 1983.56 The LTTE pursued from the outset a military strategy to 
establish the territorial and institutional bases for independence against an overwhelmingly 
Sinhala military. 57  From fifty cadres in 1983, in 2006 the LTTE fielded a conventional army 
of an estimated 20,000 troops, a powerful naval arm and a rudimentary air force. It had also 
established de facto modes of governance in the extensive areas it controlled.58 In short, by 
the turn of this century, the LTTE had emerged as the leading Tamil political actor, a point 
underscored by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a coalition of political parties, which 
came together in 2001 explicitly on a manifesto demanding the government negotiate a 
political solution with the LTTE.59 Furthermore, following the LTTE’s military demise, 
Tamil politics is visibly coalescing around the around the demand for territorial political 
autonomy – exemplified by the recent electoral successes of the TNA and the recent broad 
based coalition of civil society groups explicitly endorsing the principle of Tamil 
nationhood.60 This is moreover amidst episodic confrontations between a resentful Tamil 
population and the Sinhala military.61 
The international community’s consistent support for the Sri Lanka’s military efforts against 
the LTTE – although based on the specific understanding of conflict discussed here – was 
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nevertheless conditional on the relevant government’s willingness to engage in liberal reform. 
As a consequence having given the Rajapakse led government the ‘green light’ for war in 
2006, international disquiet over the military strategy grew, becoming open from late 2008. 
Far from ushering in a process of renewed liberal reform, the onset of conflict in 2006 led to 
three years of high-intensity and, even by Sri Lanka’s standards, exceptionally bloody 
fighting along with enormous humanitarian suffering and heavy civilian casualties. The ‘All 
Party Representatives Conference’ had gone nowhere and was revealing itself to be a sham. 
Moreover, having weakened the LTTE by 2008, the government, rather than pushing for 
negotiations and a political solution, was escalating and widening the military onslaught 
triggering further new waves of displacement amid heavy casualties, and ignoring calls by the 
West and India for a political solution. Matters came to a head in the final months of the 
conflict in early 2009. The government explicitly and vehemently rejected calls by leading 
western states – including an explicit demand by President Barack Obama62 – for Sri Lanka 
to refrain from shelling hospitals and civilian locations, and allow international access to 
supply aid and evacuate civilians. Instead Sri Lanka further tightened humanitarian access 
and escalated its bombardments. The war finally ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the 
LTTE and the mass killings of 40,000 Tamil civilians.63  
The military destruction of the LTTE has not lead to liberal peace, but the opposite: an 
acceleration and intensification of state led process to entrench Sinhala Buddhist military, 
economic and political dominance. Sri Lanka’s military budget has grown repeatedly (even 
by 2006, its army was twice the size of Britain’s) and the military now dominates social, 
economic and political life in the Tamil speaking areas, that is in turn provoking growing and 
palpable Tamil resentment.64 As a consequence there has also been growing tensions between 
Sri Lanka and its former backers in the war against the LTTE. By 2011, the dominant theme 
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of liberal peace engagement with Sri Lanka was turning on accountability for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed during the final stages of the war, with the explicit 
reference to command responsibility at the top of the government, as well as pressuring the 
state over long running issues of massive Tamil displacement, disarming of army-backed 
paramilitaries and negotiating a political solution, now with the TNA. 65 In early 2012 the UN 
Human Rights Council adopted a US sponsored resolution calling on Sri Lanka to take 
concrete steps towards reconciliation and accountability. The resolution, vehemently resisted 
by the Sri Lankan delegation, was backed by EU countries, the UK and India.66 At the time of 
writing, amidst increasingly vocal international insistence, the government is defiantly 
refusing to accede any of these demands.67 
Nepal:  
The nature of international interventions in Nepal’s Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) and of 
international peacebuilding in the country, manifestly framed in liberal peace terms since 
2001, illustrate both the continuities in terms of political objectives sought by the conflict 
protagonists before, during and after the conflict, and the impact of international action on the 
conflict’s decisive end and outcomes. Significantly, international actors started paying 
attention and playing an active role in Nepal’s internal armed conflict only after 2001, five 
years after the launching of the People’s War against Kathmandu’s Government. At its 
outset, the Maoist uprising was dismissed out of hand as a fairly irrelevant ‘slow burning 
insurgency’ at the periphery of Nepal’s territory by both the Nepali government and 
international actors. Governmental response was limited to police action in this period, but 
confrontation with security forces increased and casualties mounted steadily as Maoist 
territorial control expanded until reaching by 2001 approximately half of Nepal’s territory. 
The Maoist organisation also grew rapidly as they instituted de facto forms of ‘local 
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government’ in the captured areas, in line with their political agenda; these areas effectively 
featured a ‘parallel state structure’.68  
Nepali Maoists demanded a radical process of state-restructuring through constitutional 
reform by an elected Constituent Assembly – a promise made by King Tribhuvan already in 
1951 but never fulfilled. The Maoists sought the removal of the Hindu monarchy through the 
declaration of a secular republic, the inclusion of the country’s historically marginalised 
socio-cultural groups and the tackling of socio-economic inequalities – long-standing issues 
they deemed Nepal’s 1990 re-democratisation had left unresolved.69 In 1990 a pro-democracy 
People’s Movement brought to an end three decades of monarchical autocracy (1960-1990). 
However, radical communist parties – which included future Maoist leaders Dr. Baburam 
Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal (a.k.a. ‘Prachanda’), many ethno-linguistic minorities and 
lower caste groups regarded the 1990 Westminster-style institutional settlement of 
constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy as insufficient to deliver the changes 
sought by different political actors since Nepal’s first democratisation in 1950-1 to transform 
the country into a truly democratic, equitable and inclusive polity.  
The Maoist transition from parliamentary process to armed struggle, and back again, was 
framed by clear organisational and political objectives. The Bhattarai-led faction of the 
United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN) engaged in parliamentary politics up until 1994 when it 
failed to get recognised by the Electoral Commission to contest the 1994 mid-term elections70 
and then further radicalised. On 4 February 1996 the UPFN submitted to the Government a 
list of forty demands threatening an armed uprising had those requests remained unfulfilled. 
Soon after, coordinated attacks were launched on government posts marking the beginning of 
the People’s War. Dr. Bhattarai – currently Nepal’s Prime Minister and a key leader during 
the insurgency – draws an explicit connection between his group’s parliamentary 
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participation in the early 1990s and later Maoist military activities: ‘We participated in order 
to utilise the election as a forum for promoting revolutionary politics by demanding basic 
rights for oppressed people. […] Our activities in parliament were one forum of our 
preparations for the People’s War’.71  
In fact, the Maoists withdrew from the first round of peace-talks and resumed the hostilities 
in November 2001, officially due to the Government’s refusal to entertain their demand for a 
Constituent Assembly. At this point the Government and international actors chose to no 
longer ignore the Maoist insurgency. Nepal’s Government responded to the broken ceasefire 
by declaring a state of emergency, deploying the Royal Nepal Army for the first time 
alongside police on the battlefield, and declaring the Maoists a ‘terrorist group’, increasingly 
pressurised by the post-9/11 global discourse of the WoT.72 In fact, King Birendra (reigned 
1975-2001) had refused to deploy the Royal Nepal Army against the growing Maoist 
guerrilla campaign. However, despite the suspicious circumstances of the ‘royal massacre’ in 
June 2001 his interventionist brother, King Gyanendra (reigned 2001-2008), ascended to the 
throne.73  
The international community – with India, the US and EU countries at the forefront – started 
to strongly support the state in the conflict – in primis the Monarchy – in order to end the 
insurgency by military defeat of the Maoists regarding them as antithetical to the normative 
and institutional objectives of liberal peacebuilding.74 In fact, already during the peacetalks, 
the Indian and US Governments used anti-terrorism legislation to proscribe the Maoists, 
while India moved troops to the Nepal border.75 This had immediate effects on the 
negotiations: as Maoist leader Ananta describes – ‘Before 9/11, the government showed 
flexibility. But after that [...] the US-backed Deuba government began to behave towards us 
in such a way as to tell us: ‘You have to surrender or go back to war’.76 However, as in Sri 
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Lanka, this pattern of support cannot simply be understood through the catch-all lens of the 
‘WoT’ or indeed realist attempts to maintain stability by shoring up the state. Instead, as 
illustrated by Duffield, selective support for the counterinsurgency campaign was conditional 
on perceptions of the Monarchy’s capacity and willingness to eventually engage in liberal 
reform.77 As a result the Maoist opening to the possibility of multiparty democracy as early as 
2003 went largely ignored.78 
International support for the Monarchy as the agent of liberal order between 2001 and 2005 
was clear and unequivocal, despite King Gyanendra’s first bout of autocratic rule in 2002-3 
and growing evidence of human rights abuses committed by security forces.79 As Whitfield 
explains, ‘the international response hit a nadir in October 2002 as diplomats offered tacit 
support to King Gyanendra’s abrupt dismissal of the government. Its overall impact had been 
to strengthen the state rather than to reform it’.80 While the King oscillated between 
sidelining and including the parliamentary parties into the political process, the international 
community singled out the Monarchy as its preferred interlocutor to propel liberal peace 
goals. In April 2003 the Nepal and US Governments signed a Memorandum formalising their 
participation in the Antiterrorism Assistance Program; five days later US State Department 
slotted the Maoists in the second-tier “Other Terrorist Groups” list amidst the 2003 talks.81 
Unsurprisingly, Nepal became a member of the World Trade Organisation in April 2004. 
A radical shift in the international community’s attitudes towards the conflict protagonists in 
Nepal took place in 2005 when King Gyanendra resumed absolute powers and declared a 
second state of emergency in February. The heavy crackdown on the media, the 
intensification of conflict and growing human rights violations shook the basis for 
international support to the Monarchy as the preferred agent of liberal ordering as the ‘royal 
coup’ was deemed to ‘heighten the prospect of outright state failure’.82 Progressively, 
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international actors took notice of the growing discontent towards the regime and capitalised 
on it by reversing their choice of selective inclusion of conflict protagonists to propel liberal 
peace goals. India and the European Union, while withdrawing military aid to the King, 
began supporting negotiations between the Maoists and the parliamentary parties in view of 
finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict and a more direct path to secure stable liberal 
democracy and market economy in Nepal.  
In the meantime, the US continued to urge the King to reach out to the political parties, while 
counselling the parties against collaborating with the Maoists.83 As late as 2005, US officials 
characterised the Maoist agenda in unequivocal terms as that of a ‘one party totalitarian 
state’.84 Significantly, US-led efforts to marginalise the Maoists were undermined by 
Gyanendra’s own unwillingness to compromise with the parties. While some international 
actors were more willing to make this tactical change than others, the strategic objective was 
shared by the international community and there was a clear directionality to the movement. 
As a result, the US got on board of the new international approach to Nepal’s conflict. 
A cable of the US Embassy in Kathmandu released by WikiLeaks illustrates the difficulties 
posed by the many ‘regressive steps taken by the King’.85 A Danish diplomat declared that 
Nepal was heading towards a republic, since neither the King nor the Crown Prince 
commanded the trust of the people, thus suggesting international support for a new 
constitutional process inclusive of the Maoists.86 In fact, as the emergency was lifted on 30 
April 2005, there followed a series of negotiations between the Maoists and the political 
parties. The process resulted in the November 2005 anti-monarchical agreement sealed in 
Delhi – signalling India’s explicit approval to the alliance. The parties conceded the long-
term Maoist demands for the election of a Constituent Assembly and implementation of 
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‘absolute democracy’ through a ‘forward-looking restructuring of the state’ to include groups 
excluded on the basis of gender, class, caste, language, region, ethnicity, and region.87  
Coordinated antimonarchical agitations organised by the Maoists and parliamentary parties in 
April 2006 succeeded in ending King Gyanendra’s internationally isolated autocracy and 
restoring democracy. Following intense negotiations, on 21 November 2006 the Government 
and the Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which paved the way for a 
process of institutional reform to ‘build a new Nepal’ and manage arms through UN 
assistance.88 Demands for an immediate and unconditional surrender of Maoist weapons, 
together with demobilisation of combatants, continued. The Maoists refused. Compromise 
was eventually reached to restrict both the PLA and the Army to their respective barracks; 
however, the Maoists kept control over their weapons, while agreeing to make them available 
for UN inspection. Despite their ongoing potential for violence, the Maoists were inducted 
into the process of Nepal’s liberal ordering.89 New bouts of violence erupted since the end of 
the People’s War – notably the Madhesi Andolan in early 2007 in the Terai. However, we 
maintain that Nepal’s Maoist insurgency came to a decisive end in 2006 and that the kind of 
violence which emerged in the wake of the Peace Agreement was qualitatively different. 
Recent violence voices demands for group-based inclusion into the emerging new state 
structures, it does not challenge the raison d’être of the Nepali state as the People’s War did. 
Importantly, from 2006 the Maoists worked to (re) convert their former military structure into 
a political organisation.90 In January 2007, immediately after the new Interim Constitution 
was promulgated, Maoist delegates joined the Interim Legislature and the Cabinet, resuming 
parliamentary politics. At the same time, the UN Security Council created the UN Mission in 
Nepal (UNMIN) to support the peace process.91 On 10 April 2008, the Interim Government 
succeeded in holding peaceful elections, which resulted in the Maoist party gaining a relative 
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majority in the Constituent Assembly.92 The Maoists then moved to consolidate a framework 
for political change that excluded the King; notably the first meeting of the elected 
Constituent Assembly abolished the monarchy. While negotiations continue on the precise 
shape of Nepal’s new constitutional framework whose extended deadline is now set for May 
2012, significant steps have already been taken to integrate former Maoist combatants into 
the Nepal Army. Having carved out the institutional space to reform the Nepali state in line 
with their agenda, the Maoists have laid down their arms and resumed parliamentary politics. 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined international liberal peacebuilding efforts in the Nepali and Sri 
Lankan conflicts. International actors framed these conflicts as outcomes of weak or 
illegitimate (illiberal)93 governance compounded by perverse political economies, rather than 
the organised and violent contestation of competing political projects. In an effort to 
create/strengthen liberal democratic institutions along with a market economy – as the only 
means of ensuring a self-sustaining peace – international actors operated according a logic of 
‘exclusion and selective incorporation’94 where by those local actors perceived as committed 
liberal ‘national’ reformers were included and rewarded and those deemed inimical to the 
liberal project were excluded and subject to sanction. The analysis indicates that these efforts 
failed to produce inclusive process of liberal reform – and in Sri Lanka exacerbated the 
underlying ethnic polarisation. These starkly divergent – and sometimes perverse – outcomes 
of liberal peacebuilding in Nepal and Sri Lanka can be explained in terms of a blindness to 
the deep linkages between clashing political projects on the one hand and armed conflict as 
organised violence on the other as evident in the continuities between the pre-war, war and 
post-war political dynamics of both countries.  
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What would this reading of the deep continuities between politics and violence in Nepal and 
Sri Lanka have entailed for international activity? In concrete terms, this would have had 
specific implications for the Norwegian led peace process in Sri Lanka. Importantly during 
the peace process and in the 2006-8 period of war international actors simply accepted that 
Sri Lankan state actors were committed to liberal reform even though there was no historical 
evidence to support this view and the politics of popular mobilisation by all major Sinhala 
parties suggested otherwise.95 If international actors had recognised the Sri Lankan state – not 
as a potential agent of reform – but a historically constituted political actor committed to an 
ethno-centric ideal, the opportunity of the peace process could have been used to insist more 
forcefully on substantive state reform alongside the massive focus on the containment and 
transformation of the LTTE96 (understood as the sole obstacle to peace). In other words, the 
use of ‘conditionalities’ and ‘sanctions’ could have been geared more evenly towards both 
goals.97 In Nepal likewise, support for the state and military could have been more 
conditional to their respect for democratic practice and human rights. 
The analysis of Nepal and Sri Lanka suggests that in the absence of full and substantive 
institutional restructuring, antagonist conflict – including ongoing political and economic 
marginalisation – will persist. We would agree with the persistent conflict principle that 
inclusive, accountable and resilient institutions can accommodate and facilitate agonistic 
conflict that is in turn productive of cross-cutting allegiances and positive sum economic and 
social outcomes. However, our analysis of Nepal and Sri Lanka suggests that institutional 
restructuring (for liberal peace) is never just the product of a process of inevitable reform 
(consequent to the absence of war), but rather a function of decisive political shifts. In Nepal, 
this possibility was opened up by the creation of a Constituent Assembly deputed to create 
more inclusive state structures. In Sri Lanka, institutional reform cannot occur despite the 
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defeat of the LTTE because of the entrenched and politically robust Sinhala Buddhist 
character of the state. 
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